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LAND-USE MANAGEMENT
IN DELAWARE'S COASTAL ZONE
The vastness and variety of the resources of this nation's coast-
al area have in the past generally been sufficient to support a
number of different land uses. Recreational, commercial, and in-
dustrial facilities have developed together,1 generally at the ex-
pense of the natural environment. 2 These land uses, however,
including the natural environment in its unused form, no longer
simply coexist, but now actively vie for the limited coastal area
remaining.3 The legislatures of several states have attempted to
resolve this conflict in a variety of ways. In June of 197 1 the
Delaware General Assembly enacted the Coastal Zone Act
(CZA),4 a measure regulating the uses of the coastal zone either
by permit or by outright prohibition. This note examines similar
legislation which states other than Delaware have enacted and
then discusses the CZA. Because of the significance of the Dela-
ware Act, other states may be tempted to emulate its basic pat-
tern. They should do so, however, only after considering that the
CZA may be peculiarly appropriate to Delware. Furthermore,
the reasonableness of the CZA's prohibition of heavy industry
from the coastal zone may be more tenuous for states other than
Delaware.
I. STATE REGULATION OF THE COASTAL ZONE
Nearly all states with shorelines bordering the oceans or the
Great Lakes have legislated some regulation or planning study of
their respective coastal zones.5 The purpose of the regulation is to
'One authoritative study catalogues the following major uses of the coastal zone:
housing, industry, harbors, recreation, generation of power, fisheries, aquaculture, oil and
mineral exploraiion, and transportation. Although some of these activities take place on
shore and others offshore, the most intensive use of the coastal zone is at the water's edge.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR
NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION 52-56 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
THE STRATTON COMMISSION].
2 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE NATIONAL ESTUARINE POLLU-
TION STUDY, S. Doc. No. 91-58, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 283, 304-09 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as THE NATIONAL ESTUARINE POLLUTION STUDY].
31d. at 337-40.
4Coastal Zone Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7001 et seq. (197 1) [hereinafter cited as
Coastal Zone Act or CZA].
5 Although it is generally the states which provide for the administrative agencies to
regulate the use of the coastal zone, land planning and management programs carried out
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mediate the conflict engendered by the several users who seek to
occupy the same coastal area, or who will occupy different re-
gions of the area with detrimental effects on other occupants.
6
Although the means of conflict resolution vary from state to state,
they generally have been enacted to promote the public health,
safety, and welfare. 7 For example, the Connecticut statute quite
specifically articulates that state's concern: present and future
despoliation of coastal areas adversely affects marine life, com-
mercial fishing, recreation, and aesthetic enjoyment in the vicin-
ity; furthermore, this despoliation will impair natural flood control
and result in the silting of channels of navigation.8 These in-
vocations of appropriate rationales for the exercise of the state
police power are no doubt intended to legitimate the actions of the
state in restricting the rights of private landowners. 9 For while
there is no doubt that the preservation of coastal areas is an
essential task for the states to undertake, 10 the question remains
as to which methods of resolving conflicting uses of the coastal
zone will satisfy the totality of public needs. 1'
by interstate agencies created by interstate compacts are playing an increasingly significant
role. 6 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, NATIONAL
ESTUARY STUDY D-I to D-21 (1970).
6 When several land users compete for a single area of land, it may become the role of
the government to mediate among their claims. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1964). Professor Sax describes this governmental role by distinguishing
it from the role the government plays as a participant in the conflict.
THE NATIONAL ESTUARINE POLLUTION STUDY, supra note 2, at 283, emphasized the
need for a continuing system to resolve conflicting claims to the coastal zone:
Institutional management copes with the problems of responsibility and au-
thority in achieving maximum multiple use of the estuarine resource. With
this comprehensive framework technical management must resolve the prob-
lems surrounding conflicts of use, competition for the resources of the estua-
rine zone, and environmental damage. The primary objective of technical
management is to achieve the best possible combination of uses to serve the
needs of society while protecting, preserving, and enhancing the biophysical
environment for the continuing benefit of present and future generations.
For an informative discussion of injuries resulting from conflicting uses, see id. at 35- 38,
283-312.
7 See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 390.640(l) (1971).
8 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 22-7h (Supp. 1972).
9 But see State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970), in which the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court held that a denial by the Main Wetlands Control Board of a permit for
improvements was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. Id. at 716. While the
court found the actions of the state in implementing the statute quite commendable, it
found that the ensuing diminution in value which the landowner would suffer was too
severe to be borne by him without compensation. Id.
For an interesting and original view of this uncompensated taking problem, see general-
ly Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J, 149 (1971).
1o THE STRATTON COMMISSION, supra note I, at 57, recommended that Congress enact
both policy objectives for the management of the coastal zone and a system of
grants-in-aid to implement management by the states.
11 For example, one of the catalysts for the enactment of the CZA was the announce-
ment by Shell Oil Company of its intent to build a large refinery at Smyrna, along the
Delaware coast. Lindsay, Showdown on Delaware Bay, SATURDAY REV., Mar. 18, 1972,
at 34. It is certainly arguable that the public requires the products of the petroleum
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The coastal zone itself is generally defined to be the land area
between mean low tide and mean high tide, 12 but definitions may
also be expressed in terms of varying distances from the shore-
line.' 3 This regulated zone is variously known as shorelands,
4
wetlands,' 5 or salt marshes.16 Moreover, while most states regu-
late all lands in the coastal zone,17 a few restrict only those
activities conducted on public lands.' 8 States whose shorelines
border on the Great Lakes regulate those areas within a certain
distance from high-water elevations. 19
A common form of state regulation is to require one who will
carry on certain activities to apply for a permit or license. 20 The
regulated activities tend to be those which impair the ability of the
coastal area to support marine life, commercial fishing, and recre-
ation. Activities requiring permits include dredging and filling,
2 1
draining, 22 depositing sanitary sewage, 23 constructing improve-
industry at least as much as it needs a site for recreation. The conflict of public needs is
also apparent in the controversy between Badische Analin und Soda Fabrik, a manufac-
turer who intended to locate in South Carolina's coastal zone, and local groups with
significant interest in tourism and conservation. Ludwigson, Managing the Environment in
the Coastal Zone, I BNA ENVIR. RPTR. MONOGRAPH No. 3 at 3-5 (1970).
12 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483-A:l-a(l) (Supp. 197 1), defining the regulated
area to be that land submerged or flowed upon by mean high tide: and ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 4701 (Supp. 1972) defining the regulated zone to be:
any swamp, marsh, bog, beach, flat or other contiguous lowland above
extreme low water which is subject to tidal action or normal storm drainage
at any time excepting periods of maximum storm activity.
Massachusetts, while regulating areas adjacent to coastal waters, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
130, § 27A (1972), establishes as well a licensing requirement for activities on inland
marshes. Id. ch. 131, § 40. See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §483-A:l-a(1) (Supp. 1971),
applicable to land areas surrounding large lakes.
13 CAL. GOV'T CODE §66610 (West Supp. 1972) gives the San Francisco Bay Con-
servation and Development Commission jurisdiction over lowlands one hundred feet
inland from the line of mean high tide. In Texas, permits are required for land located
within 1500 feet of any public beach. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5415g, § 2 (Supp.
1971).
14 
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § § 90.58.030(2)(c)-(e) (Supp. 1971).
15 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN § 13:9A-2 (Supp.
1972).
16See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 2-1-14 (Supp. 1972).
17 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 27A (1972). By requiring permits for dredging
and filling in private lands along the Gulf Coast and by prohibiting these activities outright
in state-owned lands, Texas regulates all shorelands and beaches. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5415g, §§ 2, 6 (Supp. 1971).
1
8 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 719, 721 (1970) which regulates by permit
only those wetlands which were not transferred by the state with a valid lease or patent.
Private wetlands are regulated by rules promulgated by the Secretary of Natural Re-
sources. Id., §722. See Note, Maryland's Wetlands: The Legal Quagmire, 30 MD. L.
REV. 240, 25 1-53 (1970).
19See, e.g., Wis. REV. STAT. § 59.97 1(1) (Supp. 1972).
20 
THE NATIONAL ESTUARINE POLLUTION STUDY, supra note 2, at 414- 15.
21 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §483-A:1 (Supp. 1971): R.I. GEN. LAWS
§46-23-6(D)(6) (Supp. 1972).
22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4701 (Supp. 1972): GA. CODE ANN. § 45-140 (Supp.
1971).
23 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4701 (Supp. 1972).
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ments, 24 mining of mineral deposits, 25 and damaging or removing
sand dunes.
26
The agency from which an applicant may seek a permit is often
a local governmental board, whose approval is subject to an
agency of the state government.27 This procedure allows permits
to be issued in accord with a statewide plan for centralized moni-
toring of regulated uses in the coastal zone. The standards govern-
ing the granting or denial of a permit insure that the conflicting
interests in the coastal zone will be considered.2 8 Appeal from the
first determination is to a specific review board29 or a court with
proper jurisdiction.3 0 If the appellate court deems denial of a
permit to be an unreasonable exercise of the police power, con-
stituting an uncompensated taking, the court may acquire an in-
terest in the property by eminent domain3 2 The common sanction
for the violation of the permit system is a fine.
33
permit system is a fine.
33
The imposition of a permit scheme commonly does not affect
existing operations which, if initiated in the future, would require
permits.34 Several states provide that agencies may regulate by
24 ORE. REV. STAT. § 390.640(I) (197 1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.041 (Supp. 1972).
2N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAW §3(5) (McKinney Supp. 1971); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 205-33(a) (Supp. 1971).
26 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104B-4(a) (1972).
2 7 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 27A (1972), authorizing the local board of
selectmen or licensing agency, the Department of Public Works, and the Director of
Marine Fisheries to impose conditions when application is made for a permit. Never-
theless, the locality may still have the ability to prohibit construction, in spite of approval
by the agencies regulating coastal activities, through the legitimate exercise of its zoning
powers. Golden v. Board of Selectmen,-Mass.-, 265 N.E.2d 573 0970). See also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 104B-6 (1972), giving counties powers of administration. But see N.J. STAT.
ANN. 13:9A-4(c) (Supp. 1972), requiring an applicant to seek a permit from the state's
Commissioner of Environmental Protection; and ORE. REV. STAT. § 390.650(l) (1971),
designating the State Highway Engineer as the appropriate agency.
28 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 721 (1970) requiring the Board of Public Works
to decide in accord with the "best interests of the State, taking into account the varying
ecological, economic, developmental, recreational and aesthetic values each application
presents .... See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §4702 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 390.655 (1971).
29 
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § I 13-229(f)(Supp. 1971).
3 0 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-7n (Supp. 1972).
31 See, e.g., Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104,
108- 10, 206 N.E.2d 666, 670-71 (1965) (case remanded to determine whether diminution
in value was so significant as to require compensation). For a discussion of diminution of
value and uncompensated takings, see also Sax, supra note 6, at 50-61.32See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-7n(a) (Supp. 1972): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 483-A:4(11) (Supp. 1971).3 3 See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5415g, § 14 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §22-7o (Supp. 1972). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-46.1-1 (Supp.
1972), making the disturbance of the ecology of intertidal salt marshes a criminal offense,
the penalty for which is a fine and costs of restoration.
4 E.g., the requirement of a permit by the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission does not apply to existing uses. CAt. GOV'T CODE § 66654
(West Supp. 1972).
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administrative order those existing activities which decrease the
value of the coastal zone,35 but those who are regulated may
nevertheless contest an order on the ground that it is an uncom-
pensated taking. 36 In at least one state, regulation of privately
owned wetlands is by order alone3 7
Regulation of coastal areas by zoning is distinguished from
regulation by permit in that zoning affirmatively allows a particu-
lar activity in specified areas while proscribing that same activity
in other areas. As a means of resolving conflicting land uses,
zoning can balance the needs of those who use the coastal zone38
and give notice to users that they may locate only in certain areas,
if anywhere.3 9 In order to establish the zoning plan, the state
administrative agency inventories the subject coastal areas.40 In
some jurisdictions, the primary responsibility for mapping these
areas lies with the localities. 41 The appropriate agency then de-
35
See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-2 (Supp.
1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,§ 4754 (Supp. 1972).36 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (1972);N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:9A-6 (Supp.
1972).
37 MD. CODE ANN. art. 66C, §§ 722, 725, (1970).
38 Because agencies generally devise coastal zoning plans after a thorough inventory of
the uses sought to be located in the coastal area, the zoning plan can be a plan which
manages those uses throughout the coastal zone. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 281.631-.645 (Supp. 1972). This method of management by zoning is highly esteemed.
THE STRATTON COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 49, pointed out that:
The key to more effective use of our coastland is the introduction of a
management system permitting conscious and informed choices among devel-
opment alternatives, providing for proper planning, and encouraging recogni-
tion of the long-term importance of maintaining the quality of this productive
region in order to insure both its enjoyment and the sound utilization of its
resources. The benefits and problems of achieving rational management are
apparent.
39 The zoning plan is generally enacted as an ordinance of the appropriate locality. The
areas in which a regulated activity may be conducted should be apparent from the
ordinance.
40 See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 281.631-.654 (Supp. 1972) (originally enacted
as the Shorelands Protection and Management Act of 1970). This act instructs the
Michigan Water Resources Commission to undertake an engineering study to determine
what areas of the state's shorelands are subject to erosion. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 28 1.633 (Supp. 1972). This act also requires the Department of Natural Resources to
inventory those areas the preservation of which is necessary to the preservation of fish and
wildlife as well as areas of marshes along and adjacent to shorelines. Id. § 281.634. The
agencies which will have conducted these studies will then pass their findings on to the
appropriate localities in order that the localities may zone these areas appropriately. Id.
§§ 281.635-.639.
See also R.I. GEN LAWS. ANN. § 2-1-15 (Supp. 1972).
41 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.58.010-.930 (Supp. 1971) (originally enacted as the
Shoreline Management Act of 1971) codifies a program of cooperation between the state
and local governments in regulating all shorelines of the state. The Washington Depart-
ment of Ecology submits to local governments guidelines for zoning programs which will
regulate most shoreline areas, including land abutting rivers and streams. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 90.58.030(2)(d), 90.58.060 (Supp. 197 1). These local governments are to
develop master programs in accordance with these guidelines: if a locality fails to do so,
the Department of Ecology will promulgate the required program. Id. § 90.58.70. For
certain designated areas, defined by the statute as "'shorelines of state-wide significance"
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signates by rule or order what activities and uses will be allowed
in the inventoried areas. 42 No one may obtain a permit for a use
other than that specified in the plan. 43 This method rationalizes
the permit system, which, without the use of a statewide plan,
would remain an essentially ad hoc device.
Rather than using direct regulation by permit or zoning, some
jurisdictions have elected to resolve conflicting needs for the
coastal zone by land planning programs. 44 The most active and
affirmative of these planning operations are programs which un-
dertake to locate power generating facilities. 5 By acquiring prop-
erty or inventorying and preserving suitable locations in advance
of the time at which power companies will purchase them, the
state may be able to balance rationally the competing needs of the
consumer of power, the supplier of power, and the environment.
46
Less direct planning activities include shoreline management stud-
ies inventorying coastal areas and setting guidelines, adherence to
which is not always required by statute, 47 and advisory councils,
(Id., § 90.58.030(2)(e)), the Department has authority to review and develop an alternative
to the local proposal, should the local proposal not conform to a standard of statewide
interest. Id. § 90.58.090(2). Although enacted and codified, the Shoreline Management Act
is the subject of a referendum to be held in November, 1972. Id. § 90.58.930.
42 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.97 1(1) (Supp. 1972), enabling counties to zone lands
abutting lakes and streams in unincorporated areas. If the county fails to adopt adequate
regulation, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources will promulgate an appro-
priate order. Id. § 59.97 1(6).
43See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 92-1-15 (Supp. 1972): WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§90.58.140(1) (Supp. 1971).
44See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§481-488 (Supp. 1972). This unique legisla-
tion empowers the state to control the location of "developments substantially affecting
local environment." Id. § 48 1. Such developments are those requiring a license from the
Maine Environmental Improvement Commission, those planning to occupy more than
twenty -acres, or those contemplating extraction of natural resources. Id. § 482(2). Before
the state will approve the development and issue the necessary license, the development
must meet certain criteria which seek to minimize the impact of the development on the
environment. Id. § 484.
45 Because power generating plants require water for cooling, they tend to be located in
the coastal zone. THE STRATTON COMMISSION, supra note I, at 53, predicted:
An increasing number of [power] plants will be located along the shoreline,
competing for valuable land, warming the local waters, and posing major
threats to the regional ecological balance.
4rMD. ANN CODE art. 66C, §§ 766-77 1 (Supp. 1971) creates the Environmental Trust
Fund, a body funded by a surcharge on utilities charges to consumers, which is to acquire
sites in accordance with a long-range plan for resale to utilities companies. The Power
Authority of the State of New York not only has the power of acquisition and resale, but
may construct, maintain, and operate power facilities as well. N.Y. PUJB. AUTH. LAW
§ 1001-1009 (McKinney 1970). In Washington, a "thermal power plant site evaluation
council" must evaluate all applications for sites for power plants before the necessary
license is granted. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § § 80.50.010-.060 (Supp. 1971).
47 When coupled with regulatory powers, such planning and management studies may be
effective means of resolving conflicts among competing needs. See, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 281.642 (Supp. 1972). Whether plans without accompanying regulation are
equally effective is doubtful. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE 99 8800-8827 (Supp. 1972)
(plan for long-range conservation and development of marine and coastal resources); FLA.
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possessed only of weak powers of review. 48 Nevertheless, some
degree of planning is better than none, and in time these latter
agencies may be given enforcement powers.
Rather than empowering agencies to resolve conflicting
land-use needs by an administrative mechanism like permits or
master plans for regulations, a number of jurisdictions have
enacted legislation which commits coastal areas to one particular
use, generally recreation. For example, Texas has enacted a tem-
porary moratorium on the sale or lease of submerged lands owned
by the state. 49 The Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection, in implementing its program of protecting tidal wet-
lands, may acquire a proprietary interest in wetlands, 50 using
eminent domain if necessary. 51 The Oregon legislature has vested
ownership of the Oregon ocean shore, except for portions dis-
posed of prior to 1947, in the state, declaring the ocean shore to
be a state recreational area.52 Florida and Hawaii have estab-
lished setback lines in coastal areas; certain activities, such as
STAT. ANN. §§370.02l I-.0212 (Supp. 1972) (coastal coordinating council to develop
master plan); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1361- 1365 (Supp. 1972) (advisory commission
to assist in preparation of a master coastal zone management plan); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§8946-151 to -161 (Supp. 1971) (marine resources council to prepare a master plan);
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5415e (1962) (advisory committee to develop a program
for the use of submerged lands owned by the state); S. Con. Res. No. 38, 1969 Gen. and
Special Laws of Tex. 3048 (calling for a comprehensive study of coastal areas).
Note, however, that the strong Delaware Coastal Zone Act, discussed in Part II infra,
is a result of a report by the Governor's Task Force on Marine and Coastal Affairs. See
note 57 infra.48
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§51:1361- 1365 (Supp. 1972); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 8946-151 to -161 (Supp. 1971); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(38) (Supp.
1971).
49 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN, art. 5415f (Supp. 1971). See also N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAW
§ 3(5) (McKinney Supp. 1971), prohibiting outright on the shorelands of Long Island
activities that elsewhere in the state are only regulated.
50 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 26-17a(b) (Supp. 1972).
51 Id. § 26-17a(c).
52 ORE. REV. STAT. § 390.615 (1971). The ocean shore is defined as "the land lying
between extreme low tide of the Pacific Ocean and the line of vegetation ..... Id.
§ 390.605(2). The policy underlying the enactment is to give the public the free and
uninterrupted use of the ocean shore. Id. § 390.6 10(1). To effectuate this policy further,
the statute also prohibits the state from alienating land in this area. Id. § 390.620.
See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5415d (1962), granting to the public the right
of access to beaches owned by the state along the Gulf of Mexico. This grant extends to
privately owned areas adjacent to public beaches, if the public has acquired a right of
access by prescription. Id. § I.
Some state courts have found absolute rights of public use in coastal areas. In State ex
rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 595-99, 462 P.2d 671, 676-78 (1969) the Oregon
Supreme Court held that the state could enjoin private construction in an area of dry sand
between the line of vegetation and the line of mean high tide, on the ground that the public
had acquired a preeminent right through this area by the ancient English doctrine of
custom. Relying on the policy of expanding public use of shoreline areas as well as on
Thornton, the California Supreme Court found that the public had the right of access to
beach areas on the basis of an implied dedication of property rights by the private owners.
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 43, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171, 465 P.2d 50, 59
(1970).
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construction, are prohibited in the regions seaward of this line. 53
These schemes, which have the effect of making recreational uses
dominant in the coastal area, differ from Delaware's Coastal Zon-
ing Act, which, while prohibiting heavy industrial uses, allows all
others, with regulation in some cases.
54
11. THE DELAWARE COASTAL ZONE ACT
To resolve the conflicting land uses in the coastal zone of
Delaware, the Delaware General Assembly has decided that the
purpose of land-use regulation is to protect the natural environ-
ment of that state's shoreline and to safeguard its use primarily for
recreation and tourism.55 The CZA states the publid policy of the
state to be to control the "location, extent and type of industrial
development" in its coastal area.56 To achieve this end, the stat-
ute completely excludes heavy industry uses 5 7 from the coastal
zone. 58 Certain manufacturing uses, other than those classified as
heavy industry, are allowed in this area only by permit.
59
53 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.052 (Supp. 1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. §205-32 (Supp.
1971).
54 See notes 57-69 and accompanying text infra.
5 5 CZA § 700 1.
56 Id.
57 Id. § 7003 states:
Heavy industry uses of any kind not in operation on the date of enactment of
this chapter are prohibited in the Coastal Zone and no permits may be issued
therefor. In addition, offshore gas, liquid, or solid bulk product transfer
facilities which are not in operation on the date of enactment of this chapter
are prohibited in the Coastal Zone, and no permit may be issued therefor.
Provided, that this section shall not apply to public sewage treatment or
recycling plants.
This prohibition of heavy industry appears to be the result of a. recommendation of a
study group which examined the problems of Delaware's coastal zone:
The task force also recommends that there be no further intrusion of in-
compatible heavy industry into the coastal zone since pollution and other
adverse environmental and social effects, normally attendant upon such de-
velopments, present serious threats to the coastal environment, the natural
resources of the bays, and the quality of life in Delaware.
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON MARINE AND COASTAL AFFAIRS, COASTAL ZONE MANAGE-
MENT FOR DELAWARE: PRELIMINARY REPORT 3-4 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT].
s CZA § 7002(a) defines the coastal zone to be:
[AJII that area of the State of Delaware, whether land, water or subaqueous
land between the territorial limits of Delaware in the Delaware River, Dela-
ware Bay and Atlantic Ocean, and a line formed by certain Delaware high-
ways and roads ....
Subsection 7002(1) then designates those highways and roads which form the boundaries
of the coastal zone. The zone extends inward for approximately two miles, to be con-
trasted with the shallow zones established by statutes regulating coastal activities in other
states. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
59 CZA § 7004(a) reads in part:
Except for heavy industry uses, ... manufacturing uses not in existence and
in active use of [sic] the date of enactment of this chapter are allowed in the
Coastal Zone by permit only, as provided for under this section.
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The statute defines "heavy industry use" in terms of the physi-
cal characteristics most frequently associated with the worst in-
dustrial polluters, setting forth as specific examples those in-
dustries which have proven most harmful to the environment. 0
The definition is not limited to these examples, however, for any
industrial development occupying more than twenty acres or em-
ploying any of several general types of industrial equipment is
excluded from the region. 61 Few plants with any dangerous pollu-
tion potential could carry on normal operations without at least
some of the listed equipment. Although current nonconforming
uses62 are not prohibited,63 any expansion of such facilities re-
quires the issuance of a permit under the normal procedures
applicable to other than heavy industrial uses. 64
These other manufacturing 65 uses are allowed in the coastal
zone only upon the issuance of a permit from the State Planning
Office. 66 An applicant who is denied a permit may appeal by right
to a new agency, the State Coastal Zone Industrial Control
Board, 67 which then must hold public hearings of record on the
Manufacturing is defined by § 7002(d) to mean:
[Tlhe mechanical or chemical transformation of organic or inorganic sub-
stances into new products, characteristically using power driven machines
and materials handling equipment, and including establishments engaged in
assembling component parts of manufactured products, provided the new
product is not a structure or other fixed improvement.
60 Id. § 7002(e) defines a "heavy industry use" to be:
a use characteristically involving more than twenty acres, and character-
istically employing some but not necessarily all of such equipment such as,
but not limited to, smoke stacks, tanks, distillation or reaction columns,
chemical processing equipment, scrubbing towers, pickling equipment, and
waste treatment lagoons: which industry, although conceivably operable
without polluting the environment, has the potential to pollute when equip-
ment malfunctions or human error occurs. Examples of heavy industry are oil
refineries, basic steel manufacturing plants, basic cellulosic pulp paper mills,
and chemical plants such as petro-chemical complexes. Generic examples of
uses not included in the definition of 'heavy industry' are such uses as
garment factories, automobile assembly plants and jewelry and leather goods
manufacturing establishments.
The Governor's Task Force had recommended that the proscribed heavy industries
include:
such installations as steel mills, paper mills and oil refineries, and any other
industry that traditionally introduces unacceptable quantities and types of
pollutants into the air, land or water and, by its very size and nature, causes
massive adverse environmental changes over a wide area.
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 57, at 3-4.
61 CZA § 7002(e).
62 Id. § 7002(b) defines a nonconforming use to be:
a use, whether of land or of a structure, which does not comply with the
applicable use provisions in this chapter where such use was lawfully in
existence and in active use prior to the enactment of this chapter.
63 Id. § 7004(a).
64 Id.
r See note 59 supra.
66 CZA §§ 7004(b), 7005(a).
67 Id. § 7007(a).
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matter. 68 The statute directs these agencies to consider the impact
which the proposed development would have on the environment,
economics, and aesthetics of the coastal zone in deciding whether
to issue a permit. 69 If the result of balancing these considerations
so warrants, an industry which is deemed to have an adverse
effect on the state's coastal ecology and to provide no offsetting
benefit can be denied a permit. Thus, if the statute is well adminis-
tered, economic development is controlled so as to avoid signifi-
cant ecological damage to the shoreline.
Unfortunately, evenhanded administration cannot always be
assumed. The effectiveness of the permit system could be under-
mined if either industrialists or conservationists came to dominate
the administering agencies: manufacturing plants with little poten-
tial for environmental harm but with important economic benefits
could be unjustifiably excluded; or polluting industries which do
not fall within the definition of heavy industry could be allowed to
locate on the coast even though they might not provide any
compensating economic benefit. 70 In this context, the importance
of the absolute prohibition on heavy industrial uses becomes
clear, for even if the enforcement agencies should fall under the
sway of business interests, only those industries with a seemingly
less dangerous pollution potential would be able to locate along
the coast.
The ultimate effects of the statute on the state's economy are
68 Id. § 7007(c).
If the appeal to the State Industrial Control Board is unsuccessful, the applicant may
appeal further to the Superior Court, the only issue being whether the Board abused its
discretion in applying standards set forth by the statute. Should the applicant prevail in any
of his appeals, § 7009 permits the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environmental
Control to acquire a fee simple or lesser interest in the applicant's property. The price is
determined by negotiations or condemnation proceedings brought within five years after a
judicial ruling that a particular application of the law is an uncompensated taking. See
notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
The Attorney General of Delaware is empowered to issue temporary cease and desist
orders against violators of the CZA. CZA § 7010. The penalty for violating the Act is a
fine of not more than $50,000 for each separate offense, the continuance of any prohibited
activity during any part of a day constituting a separate offense. Id. § 7011. Additionally,
the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to enjoin violations. Id. § 7012.
69 Id. §§ 7004(b)(1), (3). The State Planner and State Coastal Zone Industrial Control
Board must also predict the effect which the proposed development would have on
neighboring land uses, such as adjacent residential, agricultural, and recreational areas. Id.
§ 7004(b)(5). To insure that the proposed development observes local guidelines for
land-use regulation, these agencies must include county or municipal comprehensive plans
for development and conservation in their deliberations. Id. § 7005(b)(6).
70 The only issue in an appeal to the Superior Court from an adverse ruling by the State
Industrial Control Board is whether, on the record below, the Board abused its discretion
in applying the law's standards. Id. § 7008. A biased Board might be able to make a record
sufficient to justify its decision, thus preventing effective judicial review. The record,
however, must be supported by the evidence taken as a whole. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 600-18 (1965).
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speculative, but it may be that since heavy industries will be
prohibited from locating along the Delaware coast, they will not
locate anywhere in Delaware. The state lacks an extensive inland
waterway system, and therefore heavy industrial users requiring a
large water supply for manufacturing and disposal purposes will
be unable to build new plants upstream and still remain within the
state. Moreover, although heavy industries will arguably remain
free to locate just outside the protected zone and acquire rights of
way for pipelines across that area to the Delaware River or
Delaware Bay, the cost of a pipeline would probably be high.
71
This economic detriment, however, should be offset somewhat by
the economic advantages of an improved coastal environment.
More attractive beaches might stimulate the tourist industry,72
and as a result of fewer heavy industrial uses, the shellfishing
grounds of Delaware Bay might become more productive. 73 Fur-
thermore, a cleaner estuarine system might attract lighter, nonpol-
luting industries as well as other commercial activities to the
state.
74
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CZA
Although the constitutionality of the CZA has not yet been
tested, grounds for attacking its validity are readily apparent 7 5
First, the absolute prohibition provision may constitute a depriva-
71 The State Planner has recently approved a plan which allows the Wilmington Marine
Terminal, located outside the coastal zone, to pipe low-sulfur oil from its marine dock to
storage tanks within the City of Wilmington. The Planner apparently interpreted the CZA
not to apply, since the pipeline would not be connected to any structure in the coastal
zone. See Pipelines Ruled Exempt from Local Zoning, Wilmington Evening Journal, July
I, 1971, at 10, cols. 1-2. Nevertheless, the costs of land acquisition, construction, and
operation might be prohibitive for an industrial user who has no present facility outside the
coastal zone.
72 The Governor's Task Force emphasized that the coastal zone be protected for the
purpose of enhancing recreation and tourism. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 57, at 4-I
to 4-3.
73 THE STRATTON COMMISSION, supra note I, at 54, classified approximately
three-eighths of the total estuarine area in Delaware (152,000 acres out of a total of
396,000 acres) as an important commercial fisheries habitat.
74 Wilmington, Delaware, is currently the corporate headquarters for several large chem-
ical companies. A recent report by a study group associated with Ralph Nader indicates
that one of the chief purposes of the Delaware Coastal Zone Act is to maintain the
attractiveness of the state as a location for corporate headquarters. THE NADER STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON DUPONT IN DELAWARE, THE COMPANY STATE 13-54, 13-56 (197 1).75 See Legislative Note, The Delaware Coastal Zone Act, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 481,
489-94 (1972), in which the student author points out that the CZA can be assailed on at
least three constitutional grounds: as interfering with interstate and international com-
merce, in derogation of the commerce clause: as an uncompensated taking in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment: as prohibiting absolutely only those
polluting industries which are heavy industries, this being an unreasonable classification in
violation of the equal protection clause.
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tion of property without due process in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. 76 This argument is not likely to meet with success.
Reasonable zoning measures under similar challenges have been
upheld as valid exercises of the police power; 77 under the Su-
preme Court's expansive definition of that term,78 environmental
protection would probably qualify as a reasonable justification for
invoking the power.
79
Furthermore, since the statute contains a provision that a fee
simple or lesser interest can be acquired by eminent domain
proceedings, 80 it is unlikely that a court will declare the CZA
unconstitutional on its face.81 Although ultimately saving the Act,
frequent application of this section would be impractical because
of the expenditures it would require. Of course, these costs could
be offset to some degree by selling or leasing the acquired lands to
nonpolluting users.
An attack more likely to succeed is the argument that the law
establishes unconstitutionally vague standards in delegating power
to its regulatory agencies. The basic constitutional test for vague-
ness in delegation of authority is whether the statute in question
states both the purpose which the legislature sought to accomplish
and the standards by which that purpose is to be implemented
with sufficient exactness to enable those affected by the law to
understand its limits.82 The legislature need specify details only so
76 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
77 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), in which
the Supreme Court stated the test for the validity of a zoning ordinance to be whether the
regulation is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Courts are quite reluctant, except in
egregious circumstances, to find a zoning ordinance constitutionally void on its face as an
unreasonable exercise of the police power.
In Franklin Builders, Inc. v. Sartin, 207 A.2d 12, 30 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964), two cases
brought to review a decision denying petitioners the right to maintain signs in violation of
local zoning ordinances, the Delaware Superior Court referred to the Euclid decision in
affirming the order of the zoning appeals board:
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.... it would now seem beyond doubt that a State Legislature or munici-
pal legislative body has clear power to classify lands for zoning purposes, and
that takes such questions as equal protection of the law and/or due process
out of these zoning matters. (citations omitted)
78 "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
79 See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 93
(1963), where the Court stated, "There is no doubt that the states do possess power to
allocate and conserve natural resources upon and beneath their lands."
80 CZA § 7009.
81 See, e.g., Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, II 1,
206 N.E.2d 666, 671 (1965), in which the Supreme Judicial Court determined that,
although the statute in question was not constitutionally void, its application may result in
an unreasonable exercise of the police power requiring compensation.
82 United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574, rehearing denied
sub nor. Metropolitan Cooperative Milk Producers Bargaining Agency, Inc. v. Rock
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far as is reasonably practicable, and it can delegate broad powers
to the executive branch.83
Although the purpose of the statute appears to be stated with
the requisite exactitude, questions still arise as to the ambiguity of
two words pertaining to that purpose. Subsection 7004(b)(3)
states that the "aesthetic effect," defined as "impact on scenic
beauty," is to be a factor in considering requests for permits. In
the absence of more specific standards, an aggrieved party might
argue that this factor must necessarily have different meanings to
different individuals and consequently is not sufficiently precise.
The counterargument might state that "scenic beauty" is a rea-
sonably practicable standard in light of the Act's purpose to
protect the shoreline for recreation and in light of a general
cultural consensus of what is aesthetically pleasing.
A somewhat more serious flaw, however, occurs with the un-
defined term "pollution." This is a key word both in the definition
of "heavy industry use" 84 and in the list of factors to be consid-
ered in passing on permits.85 Without any further details as to the
nature and quality of the industrial discharges that this term is
intended to cover, there is no sufficiently exact standard which
those affected could understand.
The section of the statute which sets forth its purpose offers the
only guidance in supplying an implicit definition of pollution.
Since one of the main aims of the statute is to "protect the natural
environment of [the state's] bay and coastal areas and safeguard
their use primarily for recreation and tourism,"86 the word "pollu-
tion" could be read to mean those industrial effluents which are
incompatible with these goals. Although the issue is still debat-
able, this standard could be considered as sufficiently under-
standable and practicable to save the current statute from con-
stitutional infirmity. The lack of a more precise definition of such
significant terms still remains an important technical flaw which
should be cured if other jurisdictions adopt similar legislation.
IV. APPLICABILITY TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Although the Coastal Zone Act is a reasonable exercise of the
police power and an expedient solution to the problem of manag-
Royal Co-operative, Inc., 308 U.S. 631 (1939) (delegation of market control features of
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act to the Secretary of Agriculture held con-
stitutional).
83 L. JAFFE, supra note 70, at 57-72, 85.
84 CZA § 7002(e).
s5 Id. § 7004(b).
96 Id. § 7001.
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ing the competing uses of the coastal zone in a small state like
Delaware, the feasibility of a total prohibition of heavy industry
from any considerable length of coastline depends on careful
planning. The Coastal Zone Act may appear attractive to other
states which have not been as articulate as Delaware in resolving
conflicting uses. 8 7 Before a state legislature enacts a regulatory
program patterned after Delaware's approach, however, it should
scrutinize the discrete problems of its own coastal area.
Banning heavy industry from a long stretch of coastline will not
necessarily result in economic stagnation. Existing nonconforming
uses will be allowed to continue, and lighter industrial uses may
develop. Moreover, in those states which, unlike Delaware, have
an extensive inland waterway system, heavy industry will be able
to locate upstream. In drawing the boundaries of the regulated
zone, however, the legislature must provide for a sufficient buffer
zone between the industries and the beaches. Technical factors
concerning the specific characteristics of each estuarine system
would determine the extent of buffer zone necessary to protect
each coastal area. Legislatures would have to exercise caution in
resisting efforts by industry to secure an insufficiently narrow
zone since the very purpose of a restricted area would be
defeated if the natural cleansing and diluting effect of the river
were not given a chance to operate on the discharge wastes.
8
Of course, in many instances the establishment of a coastal
buffer zone will not be sufficient. To obtain maximum protection
of the shoreline as well as provide some measure of care for the
upstream ecology, a state with inland waterways should also enact
and enforce other general pollution statutes. Discharges from
upstream plants, although diluted and to some extent purged by
the time they reached the coastline, could still have an adverse
effect on the beaches.
Further pollution controls will lessen these effects and also aid
17 The New Jersey Legislature is already considering a proposal that is patterned after
the Delaware Act. N.J. Assembly No. 722 (1972). The New Jersey bill, however, would
set up three geographically distinct coastal zones: one on the Atlantic shore of the state, a
second along the lower reaches of the Delaware River estuary, and a third extending
upstream of the second to the limit of tidal action at Trenton. The inland boundary for all
three is specified as the area between the average high tide and an elevation of ten feet.
Id. § 3(a).
Within each area solid, liquid, or gas bulk transfer facilities are prohibited. Heavy
industry is banned completely in the Ocean and Bay zones, but would be allowed by
permit in the Upper River region. Id. §§ 4, 5(a). Light manufacturing would also be
permissive in every zone. Id. § 5(b).
88 Every body of water can assimilate certain amounts and kinds of waste products. THE
STRATTON COMMISSION, supra note I, at 72. Also, since pollutants may be trapped
permanently within the estuarine system and work damage that cannot be repaired,




in protecting the entire watershed area from environmental dam-
age. Since banning heavy industry from any widespread region is
not economically feasible, some controls must be available to
ameliorate the effects of the wastes that are discharged. The
Delaware Coastal Zone Act adds an additional measure of protec-
tion to the critical estuarine environment by preventing even these
reduced effluents from being discharged directly into the coastal
waters where they could have a harmful effect on the delicate
ecology of that region. What pollution does occur, whether in-
tentional or accidental, will take place farther upstream, thereby
lessening the damage to the shoreline itself.
A general pollution law alone is inadequate to protect a state's
coastline because of the difficulties of enforcement.8 9 The enforce-
ment agency must constantly be alert to the exact nature and
quality of the wastes being discharged from the plants within its
jurisdiction, a problem which the absolute prohibitions of the
Coastal Zone Act seek to avoid. Under the CZA forbidden en-
croachments into the zone would be difficult to hide and hard for
even the most lax enforcement agency to ignore. Those in-
dividuals and groups interested in continued strong enforcement
would be quickly alerted by the high visibility of violations and
could invoke the statute's safeguards.90
A more difficult problem arises with respect to those industries
which may be unable to locate upstream.91 To the extent that
heavy industrial uses of sufficient economic value and unavoid-
able pollution potential cannot feasibly be located away from the
coast, statutes resolving land-use conflicts will have to make pro-
vision for them. For example, bulk transfer facilities, 92 which are
89 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, §§ 26-53 (Supp. 1971) establishes the Division of
Water Pollution Control which is to adopt and enforce standards of water quality. Id.
H 26- 27. Discharges in contravention of its standards are punishable by fines of $1,000
per day of discharge. Id. § 42. The enforcement of this type of general pollution control
law would involve extensive monitoring and spot checking of the state's waterways. If
improper pollution levels are then discovered, the specific violator must then still be found
and caught in the act. Under these circumstances, pollution could be reduced but not
completely eliminated, for undiscovered violations are always certain to occur.
9o Both the State Planner and the State Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board must
hold public hearings on permit requests. CZA §§ 7005(a), 7007(c). Any aggrieved party
can appeal to the superior court. Id. § 7008. No statutory limitations are placed on those
parties who may seek to enjoin violations in the Court of Chancery. Id. § 7012. Both
private individuals and public interest groups thus remain free to invoke the enforcement
machinery of the Act. Since it would be impossible to conceal plans for the construction of
any prohibited or permissive use, the applicability of the statute's provisions could be
quickly determined by all interested parties.
91 Most plans for the use of the coastal zone must seek to accommodate heavy industry.
Deep water access will be essential to the future competitiveness of steel and other United
States industries which process large volumes of heavy raw materials. Future development
must also provide for added transport and power generation facilities. THE STRATTON
COMMISSION, supra note I, at 52, 53.
FALL 1972]
Journal of Law Reform
prohibited by the Delaware Act,93 require deepwater access and
yet have an enormous potential to cause ecological harm to a
coastline. Nevertheless, the age of the supertanker is upon us;
94
and although scattered jurisdictions could ban these vessels forom
their coastal waters, they will have to find a safe harbor some-
where. Development of a deepwater port should be carried out on
a regional basis, in order that both risks and benefits are shared.
95
States with larger land areas than Delaware may find it desir-
able to enact regulatory legislation which, in addition to dealing
with problems of water quality, comprehensively manages all land
uses in the jurisdiction to provide for orderly development with a
minimum of harmful external effects. Although it might be imprac-
tical for the larger states to inventory and promulgate regulations
for every square mile, they could nevertheless undertake to plan
comprehensively for those areas which are and will be most
intensely developed. Small states may find thorough regulation
easier to provide. For example, Hawaii has zoned all of its terri-
tory. The State Land Use Commission is to district the islands
into four types of zones: urban, rural, agricultural and con-
servation. 96 The counties are empowered to govern the zoning in
all but conservation districts, which are regulated on a statewide
basis by the Department of Land and Natural Resources. 97 The
Department may by regulation manage the use of conservation
areas, known as forest and water reserve zones, in order "to allow
and encourage the highest economic use thereof."' 98 The statute
provides additional protection for rural districts by requiring that,
92 CZA § 7002(f) defines "bulk transfer facility" as:
[A]ny port or dock facility, whether an artificial island or attached to shore
by any means, for the transfer of bulk quantities of any substance from vessel
to on-shore facility or vice versa. Not included in this definition is a docking
facility or pier for a single industrial or manufacturing facility for which a
permit is granted or which is a non-conforming use. Likewise, docking
facilities for the Port of Wilmington are not included in this definition.
93 Id. § 7003, stating in pertinent part:
[Blulk product transfer facilities which are not in operation on the date of
enactment of this chapter are prohibited in the Coastal Zone, and no permit
may be issued therefor.
94 The largest vessel now operating is a tanker of 3 12,000 dead-weight tons. Under
consideration are similar ships of up to 760,000 dead-weight tons. By 1980, maximum
drafts are expected to range from 39 feet for freighters to 98 feet for tankers. COMMISSION
ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, I PANEL REPORTS: SCIENCE AND
ENVIRONMENT Table 3, at 111-67 (1969).
95 The Governor's Task Force recommended that Delaware explore, on a regional basis
with the assistance of the federal government, the technical and economic feasibility of an
offshore deepwater port facility built on the continental shelf. PRELIMINARY REPORT,
supra note 57, at 3- I.
96 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-2 (Supp. 1971).
97 Id. § 205-5(a).
98 Id. § 183-41.
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unless authorized by special permit, only low-density residential,
agricultural, public, and public utility uses may locate in rural
districts. 99 The Land Use Commission is directed to update its
classification of lands at the end of each five years following its
original adoption. 100 This approach is more sophisticated than the
Coastal Zoning Act and perhaps reflects the vast developmental
difference in Hawaii's land uses. It is clear at least that Dela-
ware's approach of regulating the coastal area by prohibition and
permit must be amplified if a state is to resolve conflicting land
use needs effectively.
V. CONCLUSION
The Coastal Zone Act provides an uncomplex and potentially
effective device to attack the problem of land-use management in
shoreline areas. Its constituent mechanisms, the exclusion of any
further heavy industrial uses and the regulation of other industrial
and commercial uses by permit, reflect in a novel juxtaposition
those methods utilized by other states.10 1 The Act has resolved
the conflict among land uses firmly in favor of recreation and
tourism. Effective administration may allow these uses to occupy
Delaware's beaches without seriously damaging the coastal envi-
ronment. Yet because of Delaware's small size and lack of signifi-
cant inland areas, the Coastal Zoning Act may not be an appro-
priate mode of regulation for other coastal states. Each state
desiring to regulate the use of its shoreline should begin by sur-
veying its coastal land and then formulate a program of manage-
ment which will balance those uses in a manner which comports
with the public interest.
-Francis S. Babiarz
99 Id. § 205-5(c).100 id. § 205-11 (1963).
101 For a discussion of the resolution of conflicting land uses by prohibition and permit,
see notes 49-54, 20-37 and accompanying text supra
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